|
|
 |
|
|
|
 |
March 8, 2014 |
|
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
This article discusses the ten opportunities that the Ming dynasty could have capitalized on to save itself from destruction, but did not. Militarily, the Yellow River loop region was a strategic region that could provide the army with an abundance of war horses, and act as a base to prevent the spread of the Manchus into Mongolia. Xia Yan, the secretary of the military department, had proposed to recover the region from the Mongolia|Mongols. However, for his proposal, he was executed by the emperor, Jiajing Emperor|Jiajing, after being framed by prime minister Yan Song, who accused him of being in consort with the Mongols. The Ming dynasty was a hardliner on having bureaucrats to lead the army. The military department was usually filled by stubborn Confucianism|Confucianists who were ill-equipped to handle military affairs. A talent, such as Xia Yan, who could put forward such a strategic proposal, was therefore a rarity. The Qaghan of the Dadan (Tartars) had demanded that the Mings surrender the plains of the Yellow River loop region. At that time, the Mongols were split into inter-warring factions. However, the Ming dynasty threw away this great opportunity to recapture the region in an act of utmost foolishness. The difficulties that the dynasty faced later on against the Manchus was a result of this folly, as the Yellow River loop plains, remaining under Mongol control, led to a severe lack of war horses. The infantry-based Ming army faced tremendous setbacks in facing the charges of the Manchu cavalry. The Manchus had also accessed Mongol-controlled regions to attack Beijing by surprise, spelling the end of the Ming dynasty. The recapture of the Yellow River loop was therefore an important move to keep the Manchus in check. However, the dynasty was too busy infighting, and abandoned such an important strategic region. The national budget deficit had a number of important ramifications, chief of which were the triggering of peasant revolts arising from oppressive taxation, and the inability to pay even wages to its army, thereby leading to low morale within its ranks. In the late Ming dynasty, the national income did not even exceed 20 million taels of silver, and even with the tributes that came at the cost of riots and rebellions, it did not exceed 30 million. It did not seem right that a dynasty, boasting tremendous social productivity, would have an imbalanced national budget. The tax collection blunder in this era was that the greatest taxes were paid by the poorest group. With such a preposterous taxing policy, it was impossible for the peasants not to form rebellious movements. The "One Whip Policy", as put forward by Zhang Juzheng, was in reality a policy of taxing proportionately to one's property, and of evening out the difference between the haves and the have-nots. At the same time, land distribution and ownership were reworked to moderate social conflicts, by preventing acquisition. In the ten-year tenure of Zhang Juzheng, the national income rose to over 80 million taels, even exceeding that during the great prosperity of Kang Xi and Qian Long. After the death of Zhang Juzheng, however, his reforms were completely abolished, and his family sentenced. Wanli Emperor|Wan Li reverted to the old ways of taxation, and this led to he Shandong|Shandong and Soochow|Suzhou peasant uprisings. Thus, the pathetic state of the dynasty???s coffers in the late era, and the uprisings throughout China, had their roots in this abolishment. This is in stark contrast to the first nine years of Wan Li's reign, when the state coffers were so full, and the barns so well-stocked, that even the Rule of Wen and Jing| Wen and Jing era of Han dynasty could not surpass this great wealth. Had the Ming dynasty kept to the tax reforms, at least the problem of internal strife would not have arisen, and there would have been sufficient manpower and resources to deal with the intrusions of the Manchus. A fatal military strategy at the battle of Sar Hu resulted in the destruction of all four Ming armies, and the rise of Manchuria. Even with an army of 100,000 against the Nurhachi???s 60,000 Jurchens, the Ming dynasty was doomed to defeat, right from the start. The strategy of striking the enemy with four separate army groups proved foolish, as the size of the army was effectively reduced to 25,000, as against the Nurhachi's 60,000. Further, the state coffers were empty as a result of Emperor Wan Li???s mismanaged taxation program, and with military wages docked, the morale of the army was extremely low. Historically, Emperor Wu of Han dynasty|Han was reputed to be the first emperor to deploy this strategy of dividing the army into separate groups in warfare. In his first campaign against the Xiong Nu, he was soundly defeated, even with such illustrious generals as Li Guang in its ranks. Thus, it became a military taboo to divide the army into separate groups, more so when fighting against a nomadic enemy, such as the Xiong Nu, where the enemy is in the dark, and the army is exposed. Being unfamiliar with the terrain, the separate armies were more vulnerable to ambushes. This foolish idea of dividing the army at the battle of Sar Hu was the brainchild of Yang Hao who, without talent, had achieved his position through his relations with the eunuchs. In the seven years' war with its Korean allies against Japan, Yang Hao had fled in the battle of Wei Shan, and messed up a golden opportunity to capture Daojin Honyi, thereby allowing him to escape. Emperor Wan Li, however, had forgotten about the incident, and had carelessly allowed Yang Hao to take overall command of this crucial battle. Sun Chengzong, the secretary of the military department, had voiced his doubts, but was ignored. Had such capable generals as Xiong Tingxi and Sun Chengzhong, been allowed to lead the army, the war may yet have been won, but Emperor Wan Li, however, did not use them, thereby allowing Nurhachi to declare autonomy from the dynasty from that point onwards. Choson was a major strategic ally to China. In the last year of Tian Qi (first year of Chong Zhen), the Manchus invaded Choson twice. Choson requested for aid, but the Ming emperor not only ignored the request, but also prevented its Liao Dong army from assisting her. Choson was destroyed, and became a vassal of Manchuria. If Wan Li had been an incapable emperor, his successors, Tian Qi and Chong Zhen, were even worse. At the very least, Wan Li had understood the importance of Choson to China, and had spent seven hard years in helping Choson to ward against the Japanese invaders. The Manchus invaded Choson with almost their entire army of close to 100,000 men. The Liao Dong garrison at the Ning Mian defense line had no less than 200,000 men at the time, and they could have either assaulted Manchuria itself, or blocked the Manchus??? line of retreat at the Yalu River. Either would have sealed the fate of the Manchus, but the Ming dynasty chose to sit back and look on, while her ally was in the midst of getting decimated. Choson held out valiantly for a time, and was at one time, close to leading the Manchus into a quagmire. That the Ming dynasty had just undergone a great battle at Ning Yuan, and needed time to recuperate and consolidate her defenses, was not good enough an excuse. Even if the Liao Dong army had been insufficiently prepared, the Ming army numbered two million, and there were Ming navies docked at Shan Dong and Jiang Su. With the dynasty's maritime abilities, assisting Choson was definitely within her capabilities. Had her navy cut the Manchu's retreat at the Yalu River, Choson would still have been saved from annihilation, even if the Ming army could not achieve complete victory. But the inaction of the dynasty was a great disappointment. Prior to the loss of Choson, the majority of the Mongolian tribes had stood by the dynasty. After the loss of Choson, almost all of them submitted to Manchuria, resulting in numerous intrusions of the Manchus into the Central Plains through Mongol territory. What was worse, the abundance of natural resources in Choson provided the Manchus with even greater strength. Had Choson had not been lost, the Ming dynasty would also have a base to recover Liao Dong. Losing Choson was therefore a grave mistake. In the last year of Tian Qi, Yuan Chonghuan had signed a truce with Manchuria, but he was maligned by the eunuchs and their supporters, and forced to resign. The truce was henceforth broken. Had that truce being kept, Manchuria and the Ming dynasty would have entered into a period of temporary peace, at least. The dynasty would then have ample time and resources to recover Liao Dong. If the Ming emperors had their mind set on the recovery of the lost territories, the defeat of the Jurchens would only be a matter of time. Instead, the Ming emperors displayed such a ridiculous degree of indignation over the truce. After this incident, the Li Zicheng uprising, and a two-front war against domestic rebellions and external invasions, proved to be too much for the Ming army, leading to the destruction of the dynasty. Ever since the truce signed by Qin Kuai of the Song dynasty, the Chinese had viewed the signing of any truce with distaste, equating it to treason. Realistically, however, the signing of truces ought to be viewed impartially, the key being to view the circumstances under which the truce had been negotiated, and the terms involved. On viewing, without the geopolitical situation, the terms and conditions of the truces of the marriage ties of Emperor Gao Zu of Han with the Xiong Nu, and the alliance of Wei Shui between Emperor Taizong of Tang dynasty|Tang and the Eastern Turks, one could easily be led to conclude that both arrangements were indignant to the pride of the country. But it was the work of these treaties that had won China the time to rest and prepare for war. After those periods of rest, Emperor Wu of Han had achieved victories in his counterattack of the Xiong Nu, and Emperor Taizong of Tang had annihilated the Eastern Turks. The Ming emperors, however, were extremely myopic, and were roused to great anger on hearing about the truce with Manchuria, equating it to selling out their ancestral lands. In reality, however, the truce with the Manchus had been extremely advantageous to the Ming dynasty. The domestic government of the dynasty was corrupt, and the region within the passes had been hit by famine year after year. Peasant movements had already started throughout this region, and the Ming army had been forced to march back and forth between the Guan Zhong region and the Liao Dong fronts, hardly able to cope with such pressures. The dynasty badly needed time to take care of her domestic problems and re-establish production. A small indignity to consolidate power was therefore for the best. Furthermore, the Manchus had not being thinking of gaining the Central Plains. They also did not request for Ming princesses, nor the title of Emperor. Even complete independence was not mentioned in the treaty. The Manchus only hoped for a noble title, such that they would be on equal footing with the princes of the dynasty. This treaty had therefore no significant indignity to speak of, nor would it harm the dynasty's coffers. Overall losses would have been even less than the marriage ties between the Han dynasty and the Xiong Nu. Moreover, once signed, peace would at long last, prevail. When the Manchus first encircled Beijing, Huang Taiji used a reverse stratagem and killed Yuan Chonghuan, destroying his own "strong pin" in the process. After that incident, the Manchus made several incursions into the capital through Mongolia, and dealt severe blows to the dynasty. There are two major mistakes in this battle. The first of them was in executing Yuan. Except for the emperor and the people of Beijing, everyone throughout the state knew that Yuan was innocent. He had led his force in a thousand li assault, and intercepted the Manchu army, halting their attack. Although brilliantly won, even Yuan himself admitted that intercepting a 100,000 strong Manchu army with 9,000 cavalrymen was a gamble. Afterwards, Yuan adopted a defensive tactic to wait for reinforcements. Denied access to the city fortress, the Manchus pillaged and raped the surrounding countryside to vent their frustrations. The people of Beijing blamed this on Yuan. While the ignorance of the peasants is understandable, Emperor Chongzhen's lack of knowledge in military affairs is preposterous. Killing Yuan broke the morale of the 200,000 Liaodong garrison who had laid their lives to fight for an incompetent emperor, only to find their general executed in the market square. After the death of Yuan, many of his subordinates surrendered to the Manchus. Although Zu Dashou never gave advice while he was in the service of the Manchus, his men became the vanguard in the destruction of the Ming dynasty. Kong Youde and others were even made princes and marquises. As a result of the increased defections, the Liao Dong defense lines became increasingly weak. The second mistake was in the military strategem deployed. With the various passes along the Great Wall still under Ming control, the 130,000-strong Manchu strikeforce could have been trapped and vanquished, had the Ming dynasty force the enemy to a long standstill, and gather up a large force to strengthen the Great Wall defenses (a move which was not really difficult for the dynasty). Even if Huang Taiji could breakthrough the entrapment successfully, the spirit of the Manchu army would be broken (just as when the Russians used this tactic against Napolean Bonaparte|Napoleon). The Ming dynasty also had the option of ordering Zu Dashou to lead the Liao Dong garrison to attack Manchuria while reinforcing the capital, if she had been even more adventurous. This would directly force the Manchu army to hasten back to protect their heartland, and be intercepted halfway (the stratagem of surrounding Wei to rescue Zhao). The attack on the Manchurian heartland would then lead to the destruction of the Manchus in a single pitched battle. Unfortunately, Emperor Chongzhen knew nothing about military matters, and could not differentiate between patriots and traitors. Thus, he was contented with forcing the Manchus on a retreat. The dynasty thus lost a golden opportunity to vanquish Manchuria. In the last years of the Ming dynasty, the area within the pass suffered a great drought that lasted for eight years, forcing the peasants to revolt. Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong led these peasant revolts, and the dynasty was thrown into chaos. However, the Ming dynasty managed to suppress these uprisings. Li Zicheng was defeated, and Zhang Xianzhong surrendered. A period of peace followed, but the natural calamity continued. As the dynasty did not undertake any welfare programs to help out the peasants, they were forced into another revolt. Li Zicheng managed to recover, and subsequently toppled the Ming dynasty. The Ming dynasty must deem itself very fortunate to have successfully suppressed the first revolt of Li Zicheng, despite fighting a two-front war. It would have been a great opportunity for the dynasty to recover. Both the Han and Tang dynasties had suffered from similar droughts, but had managed to handle the matter satisfactorily. In the reign of Emperor Gaozong of the Tang dynasty, the area within the pass suffered an unrelenting drought for a decade, the most disastrous period of which, lasted four years. The Emperor, however, carried out the advice of his premier, Fei Yan, and immediately put a stop to any further military excursions against the Western Turks. He mobilized the army of 100,000 men to repair irrigation works instead. All efforts were directed at alleviating the sufferings of the victims, and although the drought continued to wreak havoc for another seven years, the area within the pass showed no signs of severe famine. Only after the Tang dynasty managed to achieve internal stability, did she despatch a military excursion to Xi Yu (the western frontier) to fight the Western Turks and extend her influence, putting the Pamil plateau under her control. In the second year of Kaiyuan of Emperor Xuanzong of Tang, the area within the pass suffered from a rare locust swarm. This natural calamity, aggravating the already harsh conditions of life under cruel local government officials who habitually extorted unreasonable taxes, drove the peasants to a revolt. Emperor Xuanzong ordered premier Yao Chong to lead the campaign to vanquish the locusts. Forty-two corrupt officials were also executed to pacify the people, and all princes and great officials were ordered to give up their wages to provide aid. These policies turned the situation around, and created the prosperity of Kaiyuan. Thus, natural calamities need not necessarily be fearful. The more important factor is human intervention. The disasters of the Ming dynasty could be attributed to poor handling. Because of the national budget deficit, the state had increased its taxes, without giving due consideration to the people who were suffering from the prolonged drought. Had the Ming dynasty done what Emperor Gaozong had done, after having successfully suppressed Li Zicheng???s first revolt, things could have been very different. Just like the two emperors, the Ming dynasty could have likewise instituted the following actions:
If these steps had been taken, Li Zicheng???s movement would never have been able to gain much popular support, and the fall of the capital to the peasant army would not have happened. Unfortunately, Emperor Chongzhen was even weaker than the weak Emperor Gaozong of Tang in handling the natural disaster. The battle of Songshan between Ming and Manchuria saw 130,000 Ming soldiers pitted against the 100,000-strong Manchu army. The Ming general, Hong Chengchou, by establishing a stratagem of encroachment and defensive warfare, and by relying on superior firearms to halt the Manchu assault, nearly forced the Manchus into a disastrous standstill. However, Emperor Chongzhen was greedy for glory, and issued four imperial edicts to force Hong on a direct assault. Hong wept bitterly, knowing that the Ming army would be defeated if they sallied out to attack. In the end, Hong was indeed defeated and captured. After this battle, which was the biggest pitched battle between the Mings and the Manchus, the Ming dynasty lost all her fortresses beyond the passes, and Shanhai Pass became the frontline. The Manchus now had the initiative on the war. The battle of Songshan, being the biggest pitched battle between both sides, was to be the decisive battle to determine the fate of either kingdom. If the Ming dynasty won, the Manchus would go down in history. Conversely, if the Manchus won, the Mings would have no staging ground outside the passes. The Manchus pitted almost all their entire army of 100,000 banner troops, while the Mings mobilized all their elite forces. Although Hong lacked in spirit, his military capabilities was still fairly strong (possibly at the level of Yuan Chonghuan), and the beginning stages of the battle were in Mings' favor. The men led by Hong were the well-armed Ningmian garrison left by Yuan. Had they fought defensively, the Manchus would have lost gravely. Zu Dashou???s defection also increased the might of the Ming dynasty, and shook the Manchu lines. Although the Ming army may have numerical superiority, the field battle capabilities of the Ming army were vastly inferior, and this was accentuated even more in large-scale warfare. On the surface, it may appear to be a normal battle between the armies, but in reality it was a struggle for a combination of food, money and logistics. Manchuria was both smaller and weaker, and a quick decisive victory would be her only chance of winning. Hong???s defensive strategy would therefore have been the best course of action for the Ming army under the circumstances. If the war had been prolonged by a few months, the Manchu army would, no doubt, have been forced to give up the fight. Just when victory was at hand, however, Emperor Chongzhen could not wait. He viewed the battle of Songshan as a top priority, and it became a disaster because of his attention. While Emperor Wu of Han did come up with his own military guidelines in dealing with the Xiong Nu, his case was different in that he knew about military affairs from his youth, and had complete knowledge of the Xiong Nu. Emperor Chongzhen, however, was nowhere near Emperor Wu, and he merely wanted fame. His four imperial edicts were worse than the classical Qin Hui???s twelve gold imperial seals. While Yue Fei brought back his whole army intact, Chongzhen???s command destroyed his army of 130,000, and the whole front. While Hong's latter acts could be deemed to be treason, he did fight to exhaustion before being captured. He might, however, be forgiven for being disloyal to an inept emperor. Even Huang Zongxi, a Ming scholar, in his "Criticisms of Chongzhen", censured the emperor for the four imperial edicts. After the fall of Beijing, the South Ming dynasty was established. A short while latter, the Manchu army crossed the Yangtze River, and occupied Nanjing without bloodshed, and the South Ming government fell. While the South Song dynasty lasted a few decades, the South Ming dynasty was vanquished shortly after its establishment. Although Emperor Gaozong of Song was foolish, he was much better than Emperor Hongguang. Unlike Gaozong, who at least knew how to organize the northern refugees into a fierce Yue army to fight against the invaders, Emperor Hongguang did not know anything, apart from leading a hedonistic life. The Ming garrisons still numbered several hundred thousand along the Yangtze River. While the people of Jiangnan had been criticized for being weak, historical records showed that the natives of Jiangnan had put up a brave fight. They had no thoughts of selling out the state, and most of the troops were determined to fight to the last. Jiading, Jiangyin and Yangzhou all dealt severe blows to the Manchu army. To vent their frustrations, the Manchu army put the cities to the sword. Had Emperor Hongguang being at least as spirited as Emperor Gaozong, and if the Ming army were united as one, using the Yangtze River as a natural barrier, the Manchus would not have been able to cross it so easily. At worse, the Ming dynasty would be forced to come to a standstill against the Manchus across the Yangtze River. Even if the Ming dynasty could not regain the lost territories, she could still continue to exist. But an incapable emperor, with a couple of treacherous ministers, and a group of corrupted Confucian scholars, full of the notions of social hierarchy, were sufficient to betray the whole state. The "Peach Fan" was sung for a millennium: 3,000 troops surrendered, but none of them were girls. <!--Some may say that Shakespeare???s "Hamlet" is the greatest tragedy. But "The Peach Fan" exceeds that in my opinion. This play uncovered a truce: why would we lose our state and why we were slaughtered.--> After the establishment of the South Ming dynasty under Emperor Yongli, General Li Dingguo dealt a series of defeats against the Qing at Yunnan, Guizhou. Although the Manchus had a million armed men, two-thirds of them were Han, and most of them were still fencer-sitters with questionable loyalty. Li Dingguo dealt successive defeats against Kong Youde and Nikan Wailan, and killed the two princes. The Qing army at the southwest was completely lost, sending ripples of doubt across the Han soldiers within its ranks. Numerous Han troops within the Qing territory also raised their banners to answer the call of the Yongli government. The governor of Huguang officially requested the Qing government to send in the eight banners, as the Han soldiers dared not fight against Li Dingguo. If the Qing were forced to send reinforcements, they would only arrive within a few months. At the same time, Zheng Chenggong was tying down the Qing army at Fujian. This presented the best opportunity in the battle against the Qing to reclaim the lost territories. Although Sichuan was blessed with natural barriers, entering Sichuan from Guizhou was far easier than entering Sichuan from the Central Plains. If Hanzhong was seized, then one can easily take the 800 li Qin Chuan in an offensive or easily retreat to a strong defensive position. If such a tactic was successful, the Ming dynasty would then be in a strong position to recover the lost lands. Li Dingguo officially requested the Yongli Emperor to attack Sichuan, seizing Bashu and Hanzhong before the Manchu main force made their drive south, so as to open the way up to the Central Plains. However, Emperor Yongli was worried that Li Dingguo would obtain more prestige than himself, and thus ordered him to stay put, and allocated part of his forces to Sun Kewang. Sun Kewang unexpectedly revolted, and the Yongli government experienced a civil war. Although the revolt was put down, the South Ming dynasty was gravely weakened. This allowed the Manchu army enough time to gather forces. Soon afterwards, Wu Sangui led an expedition into Yunnan, and destroyed the Yongli government. Compared to the numerous inept emperors of the Ming dynasty, Emperor Yongli was much better. Accepting Li Dingguo???s army of the Great West was a great proof of his ambition. Unfortunately, he also inherited the paranoia of his ancestors and dared not assign critical tasks to Li Dingguo. He also relied on eunuchs, and even trusted the questionable Sun Kewang. This was a repetition of the foolishness of the Ming emperors. The Ming dynasty had no lack in talented men, but the emperors were incompetent, and trusted the wrong men. In the end, this good opportunity was also lost. Li Dingguo was forced to retreat to Burma and died there. Yongli was captured by Wu Sangui and strangled with a bow string. The Ming dynasty had finally been destroyed. From this, it is obvious clear that the Manchus were not the ones that destroyed the Ming dynasty, but it is the Ming dynastry that destroyed itself. Virtual history http://www.tiexue.net/bbs/dispbbs.aspx?boardid=14&ID=467743 Translated by Sephodwyrm Category:History of China Category:Ming Dynasty|Fall of the Ming Dynasty This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Fall of the Ming Dynasty".
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
![[F]](/images/site.gif){kind=small}
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
All informatin on the site is © FamousChinese.com 2002-2005. Last revised: January 2, 2004 Are you interested in our site or/and want to use our information? please read how to contact us and our copyrights. To post your business in our web site? please click here. To send any comments to us, please use the Feedback. To let us provide you with high quality information, you can help us by making a more or less donation: |